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Erfahrung in Pragmatismus und Phänomenologie

Von der Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit zur Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019-2: Phenomenology and Pragmatism
DOI: 10.28937/1000108371

Inhalt

  • | Kapitel kaufen Cover1
  • | Kapitel kaufen Inhaltsverzeichnis3
  • | Kapitel kaufen Introduction: Phenomenology and Pragmatism5
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sami Pihlstrçm: Pragmatism and the Phenomenology of Suffering: Remarks on Antitheodicy Detachment, and Embodied Subjectivity13
  • | Kapitel kaufen Ryosuke Ohashi,: Phainomenon‘ und ,Pragma‘ aus euro-japanischer Perspektive – Zur Idee des ,phänomenologischen Pragmatismus‘ im Geschichtsdenken31
  • | Kapitel kaufen Matthias Jung: Philosophie als Wissenschaft? Der gesellschaftliche Ort philosophischen Denkens bei Dewey und Husserl45
  • | Kapitel kaufen Niels Weidtmann: Erfahrung in Pragmatismus und Phänomenologie – Von der Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit zur Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung65
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sebastian Luft: Phenomenology without Foundations = Pragmatism? – Or: What is Left of Phenomenology After a Pragmatic Critique91
  • | Kapitel kaufen Karin Amos: Otto Friedrich Bollnow und John Dewey im Dialog115
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sara Heinämaa: Epoché as Personal Transformation – On the Similarities between the Philosophical Changeof Attitude and Religious Conversions133
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jason Bell: Lotze’s System SIGMA: An Inspiration for Pragmatic ‘Internal and External Meaning of Ideas’and Phenomenological ’Intentionality’?161
  • | Kapitel kaufen Steven Crowell: Transcendental Phenomenology as Irony?187
  • | Kapitel kaufen Autorinnen und Autoren207

Beschreibung

This article explores the ontological status of experience. It starts by pointing out the difference between pragmatism’s empirical and Husserl’s transcendental notion of experience. Even though pragmatism, just like phenomenology, claims that in experience the experiencing and the experienced, i. e., subject and object or, in Dewey’s terms, organism and environment, belong together and may have mutual impact onto one other, this pragmatic approach does not analyze the reality of experience itself but locates experience in the empirical world. Husserl’s analysis of transcendental consciousness reveals the constitution of the empirical world by experience and therefore takes a first step beyond pragmatism’s notion of experience. However, if the world is constituted by experience, then phenomenology will have to inquire into the constitution of experience itself. In the article this is called the experience of experience or the self-experiencing experience. Only when experience can be phenomenologically proven in its self-constitution does it no longer presuppose subjectivity, but can be interpreted as the selfconstitution of reality. This must be the actual concern of a philosophy that goes back to experience if it is not to stop halfway in its attempt to found both, speculative thinking and the empirically working sciences, in experience