Mehr Ansichten

Intentionality, Agency and Personhood

Outline of a Phenomenological Theory of Acts

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.28937/1000108206

Inhalt

  • | Kapitel kaufen Titelei1
  • | Kapitel kaufen Inhalt3
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jörn Müller & Michel Summa: Introduction: Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives5
  • | Kapitel kaufen Beiträge25
  • | Kapitel kaufen José Filipe Silva: Intentionality in Medieval Augustinianism25
  • | Kapitel kaufen Nicholas A. Oschman: The Constitution of the Intellect and the Farabian Doctrine of First and Second Intention45
  • | Kapitel kaufen Gianfranco Soldati: Appearances and Illusions61
  • | Kapitel kaufen Luca De Giovanni: Husserl on Intentionality and Attention. From the Logical Investigations to Genetic Phenomenology81
  • | Kapitel kaufen Diego D'Angelo: A Phenomenology of Creative Attention. Merleau-Ponty and Philosophy of Mind.99
  • | Kapitel kaufen Antony Fredriksson: The Alien World, Attention and the Habitual117
  • | Kapitel kaufen Roberta De Monticelli: Intentionality, Agency and Personhood. Outline of a Phenomenological Theory of Acts135
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jörn Müller: A Medieval View of Practical Intentionality. Intentio in Aquinas’s Psychology of Action155
  • | Kapitel kaufen Michela Summa & Karl Mertens: On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior177
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jan Slaby: Affective Arrangements and Disclosive Postures. Towards a Post-Phenomenology of Situated Affectivity197

Beschreibung

Modern tradition takes a person to be a rational (and moral) agent, namely an agent capable of acting on the basis of reasons – often desire-independent reasons, and particularly moral reasons. So, agency and freedom are involved in the definition of personhood. But what about the embodiment of persons? What about their rootedness in the particular circumstances of a human life – time, space, community of origin, material, and axiological culture? What about the individual identity of persons, their irreducible individuality? The phenomenological notion of intentionality has a widely neglected richness of content, making it a key conceptual tool, capable of explaining not only consciousness but also rational agency, that is personhood, right from the level of the most basic and embodied instances of consciousness: perception, emotion, and spontaneous action. These should be considered as acts, rather than as states, and the discussion of the specific intentionality of these acts and their motivational relations purports to be an original contribution to a genetic phenomenology of embodied, individualized personhood and rational agency