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Phenomenology without Foundations = Pragmatism?

Or: What is Left of Phenomenology After a Pragmatic Critique

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019-2: Phenomenology and Pragmatism
DOI: 10.28937/1000108361

Inhalt

  • | Kapitel kaufen Cover1
  • | Kapitel kaufen Inhaltsverzeichnis3
  • | Kapitel kaufen Introduction: Phenomenology and Pragmatism5
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sami Pihlstrçm: Pragmatism and the Phenomenology of Suffering: Remarks on Antitheodicy Detachment, and Embodied Subjectivity13
  • | Kapitel kaufen Ryosuke Ohashi,: Phainomenon‘ und ,Pragma‘ aus euro-japanischer Perspektive – Zur Idee des ,phänomenologischen Pragmatismus‘ im Geschichtsdenken31
  • | Kapitel kaufen Matthias Jung: Philosophie als Wissenschaft? Der gesellschaftliche Ort philosophischen Denkens bei Dewey und Husserl45
  • | Kapitel kaufen Niels Weidtmann: Erfahrung in Pragmatismus und Phänomenologie – Von der Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit zur Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung65
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sebastian Luft: Phenomenology without Foundations = Pragmatism? – Or: What is Left of Phenomenology After a Pragmatic Critique91
  • | Kapitel kaufen Karin Amos: Otto Friedrich Bollnow und John Dewey im Dialog115
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sara Heinämaa: Epoché as Personal Transformation – On the Similarities between the Philosophical Changeof Attitude and Religious Conversions133
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jason Bell: Lotze’s System SIGMA: An Inspiration for Pragmatic ‘Internal and External Meaning of Ideas’and Phenomenological ’Intentionality’?161
  • | Kapitel kaufen Steven Crowell: Transcendental Phenomenology as Irony?187
  • | Kapitel kaufen Autorinnen und Autoren207

Beschreibung

This essay attempts to spell out what might be left of Husserlian phenomenology when one leaves behind Husserl’s own grounding ambitions. Husserl construes transcendental phenomenology as first philosophy. In a pragmatist vein of leaving it behind in the interest of something other, I discuss what would happen if one were to ‘pragmatize’ phenomenology. After first laying out Husserl’s vision, in a second part I reconstruct the motives that led to it in reaction to a ‘Cartesian anxiety’ of not securing an indubitable ground of knowledge. After that, the article spells out some pragmatic reflections on what phenomenology would be, without the need to secure foundations of knowledge. Such a liberation would in effect enable phenomenology to more fully make true on the ideals of the Enlightenment (which Rorty, too, underwrites) of emancipating oneself of one of the last vestiges of a dogmatic slumber.