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Transcendental Phenomenology as Irony?

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019-2: Phenomenology and Pragmatism
DOI: 10.28937/1000108365


  • | Kapitel kaufen Cover1
  • | Kapitel kaufen Inhaltsverzeichnis3
  • | Kapitel kaufen Introduction: Phenomenology and Pragmatism5
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sami Pihlstrçm: Pragmatism and the Phenomenology of Suffering: Remarks on Antitheodicy Detachment, and Embodied Subjectivity13
  • | Kapitel kaufen Ryosuke Ohashi,: Phainomenon‘ und ,Pragma‘ aus euro-japanischer Perspektive – Zur Idee des ,phänomenologischen Pragmatismus‘ im Geschichtsdenken31
  • | Kapitel kaufen Matthias Jung: Philosophie als Wissenschaft? Der gesellschaftliche Ort philosophischen Denkens bei Dewey und Husserl45
  • | Kapitel kaufen Niels Weidtmann: Erfahrung in Pragmatismus und Phänomenologie – Von der Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit zur Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung65
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sebastian Luft: Phenomenology without Foundations = Pragmatism? – Or: What is Left of Phenomenology After a Pragmatic Critique91
  • | Kapitel kaufen Karin Amos: Otto Friedrich Bollnow und John Dewey im Dialog115
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sara Heinämaa: Epoché as Personal Transformation – On the Similarities between the Philosophical Changeof Attitude and Religious Conversions133
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jason Bell: Lotze’s System SIGMA: An Inspiration for Pragmatic ‘Internal and External Meaning of Ideas’and Phenomenological ’Intentionality’?161
  • | Kapitel kaufen Steven Crowell: Transcendental Phenomenology as Irony?187
  • | Kapitel kaufen Autorinnen und Autoren207


Richard Rorty famously characterized the attitude of philosophical pragmatism as a kind of irony with respect to traditional metaphysical positions or “final vocabularies.” In both Husserl and Heidegger, phenomenology is a kind of transcendental philosophy and so would seem, despite the many connections between phenomenology and pragmatism, to be “metaphysical” in Rorty’s sense. But, as I shall argue, it too gives rise to a certain attitudinal irony. The argument will proceed by first examining some connections between Husserl’s phenomenology and the pragmatic conception of truth developed by William James, arriving at a point where Husserl might be said to become a “metaphysician.” I will then consider some connections between Heidegger’s phenomenology of Dasein (“care”) and the pragmatic conception of truth. We will then be in a position to understand that, while the attitude in which transcendental phenomenology is practiced is not one of irony, the essential element of what, for Rorty, characterizes pragmatism’s irony – namely, the incommensurability between the norms at issue in our commitments and the project of ultimate grounding – plays a crucial role in transcendental phenomenology as well.