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On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior


Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.28937/1000108208

Inhalt

  • | Kapitel kaufen Titelei1
  • | Kapitel kaufen Inhalt3
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jörn Müller & Michel Summa: Introduction: Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives5
  • | Kapitel kaufen Beiträge25
  • | Kapitel kaufen José Filipe Silva: Intentionality in Medieval Augustinianism25
  • | Kapitel kaufen Nicholas A. Oschman: The Constitution of the Intellect and the Farabian Doctrine of First and Second Intention45
  • | Kapitel kaufen Gianfranco Soldati: Appearances and Illusions61
  • | Kapitel kaufen Luca De Giovanni: Husserl on Intentionality and Attention. From the Logical Investigations to Genetic Phenomenology81
  • | Kapitel kaufen Diego D'Angelo: A Phenomenology of Creative Attention. Merleau-Ponty and Philosophy of Mind.99
  • | Kapitel kaufen Antony Fredriksson: The Alien World, Attention and the Habitual117
  • | Kapitel kaufen Roberta De Monticelli: Intentionality, Agency and Personhood. Outline of a Phenomenological Theory of Acts135
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jörn Müller: A Medieval View of Practical Intentionality. Intentio in Aquinas’s Psychology of Action155
  • | Kapitel kaufen Michela Summa & Karl Mertens: On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior177
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jan Slaby: Affective Arrangements and Disclosive Postures. Towards a Post-Phenomenology of Situated Affectivity197

Beschreibung

This article explores the roots of action in behavior. Departing from the standard understanding of action as ‘intentional behavior’, we argue that this view is often based on the underestimation of the intentional structures that are already operative within behavior. Distinguishing between a broader and a narrower meaning of intentionality, we then elaborate on the processes that lead from the diffuse and operative intentionality of behavior to the focused intentionality of action. In order to properly appreciate these processes, we show that a reassessment of the phenomenon of attention – which takes into consideration its double (passive and active) nature as well as its social embedment – is required. Finally, we discuss the interplay between the obtained reframing of the genesis of intentional actions with the phenomenon of social ascription