Abstract

The concept of ,horizon‘ is fundamental for a theory of subjectivity and even more for a theory of transcendental subjectivity. This concept was introduced by Leibniz and discussed by Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, to the aim of exploring more deeply its function in relation to the subject. Kant adopted this concept as a key-concept for his theory of experience and for his definition of logical forms as such. After Kant, the concept of ,horizon‘ reappeared in Husserl as a necessay correlate of the intentionality from a transcendental point of view. In 1913, when Husserl was working to rewrite the third chapter of the sixth Logical Investigation, he was forced to reintegrate the structures related to intuitive fulfillment with the coupled core/halo concepts, developed in 1908. On the basis of this integration, the concept of horizon emerged as a fundamental structure of perception. The structure of a single perception thus became integrated into a whole system of perception. This function of ,horizon‘ of correlating each intentional act is explicited in his late works, as the Cartesian Meditations and Experience and Judgement: each appearance consists of a whole system of appearances that are empty of content but are also potential manifestations of the same type.