Abstract

Emmanuel Levinas’ earliest development of thought is presented here as a phenomenological endeavor, i. e. in its relation to Husserl and Heidegger as well as in its own effort to give an appropriate philosophical account of ,things themselves‘. The latter task is shown to have a transcendental dimension as it is a self-awareness of conscious life in which the faithful analysis of concrete phenomena and the concept of this life itself have to be brought into attunement. The perspective of Levinas’ phenomenological gaze is then presented in these terms and shows two fairly distinct stages. Up to the mid-1930s Levinas appears as a follower of Martin Heidegger, when he advocates an appropriate approach to being in all its richness and therefore criticizes Husserl’s alleged intellectualism. Later, with a radicalized perspective, Levinas’ own philosophical project advocates an appropriate account of the problem of radical alterity beyond experience and phenomenology.He therefore criticizes both Husserl and Heidegger and remodels phenomenology so that it can adequately ,understand‘ radical alterity and at the same time confine itself before it.