Abstract

In this paper, I argue that an adequate understanding of Husserl’s late ethics of love requires careful consideration of the Neo-Kantian milieu in Southwest Germany. After discussing some general aspects of the contextualization of Husserl’s phenomenology and, in particular, Husserl’s ethics, I move to consider his transition from an action-centered to a life-centered conception of ethics. I show that this transition is largely indebted to Georg Simmel’s critique of Kant’s practical philosophy. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the problem of the value of individuality (Wertindividualit"t) that defines Emil Lask’s early work on Fichte and Heinrich Rickert’s conception of erotics (Erotik) as an autonomous domain of value is the same problem behind Husserl’s re-conceptualization of ethics around the experience of a personal call issuing from a value affecting the subject in an absolute fashion.