According to Fink, self-reference is one of the distinct features of philosophy. This isn’t merely restricted to her referring to herself thematically. Self-reference is also the key feature of philosophy’s principles, inasmuch as any principle has to be a principle for the very philosophical position explicating this principle. Thus, in my article I will look at four ways in which Fink addresses the self-referential structure of philosophy: Firstly, I will recapitulate Fink’s concept of a “meontic” philosophy. Secondly, I will link this “meontic” philosophy with Fink’s reading of Hegel’s concept of theophany, tracing it back to neoplatonic tradition. Thirdly, I will follow Fink’s reading of Hegel as it transforms his former phenomenological approach into a speculative dialectics of a metaphilosophy of philosophical principles. In a fourth and last step, I will try to give a sketch of Fink’s “phenomenology of the absolute” which combinesHusserl, Heidegger, and Hegel into a speculative phenomenology.