Abstract

This article compares the concepts of judgment of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida. At first glance, there are a number of striking parallels between the two. Both draw on Immanuel Kant’s reflections on judgment but reject his transcendentalist premises and his exclusive focus on aesthetic concerns in order to turn judging into a practice at the intersection of law and justice. Beneath these parallels, however, there are significant differences. This, we argue, is nowhere clearer than in Arendt’s and Derrida’s contrasting positions on the death penalty. The article is structured as follows. We begin by outlining the main features of Arendt’s theory of judgment and then turn to her thoughts on the trial against Adolf Eichmann, which we consider a radicalization of this theory. We show that although Arendt claims that it is our sense of justice that demands that Eichmann be brought to trial, she ultimately does not clarify what a just verdict might be in his case. Instead, she opts for the death penalty as a last resort for dealing with those who have committed crimes against humanity. Next, we discuss Derrida’s reflections on judgment. For him, the tension between law and justice is asymmetrical. Law should be understood as arising from the demand of the Other and must always remain responsive to it, despite its attempts at universalization. From this it follows, according to Derrida, that judgments ought to be open to criticism and revision. Since the death penalty does not meet this requirement, it must be rejected.