Abstract

The essay addresses Heidegger’s language in two distinct yet interrelated ways: in terms of his understanding of language as well his own jargon. The analysis is based on a close reading of the preamble to ›Being and Time‹ (›Sein und Zeit‹), which serves as an exemplar and is representative of the suggestive language-games that are characteristic of Heidegger’s philosophy. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the use of a single word, the adverb ›eigentlich‹. In a second step, the article examines the nominalized form of inauthenticity and questions its source and shows to which extent Husserl’s understanding of language serves as a contrast to Heidegger’s own understanding of language. In conclusion, it is demonstrated how Heidegger employed two distinct exoteric languages and why ›Being and Time‹ can be regarded as a critique of language.