Abstract

From a philosophical point of view, the concept of Willkür is highly problematic. Although the word »Willkür« can be originally translated as »choice ofthe will«, which means a kind of individual freedom, it has, over the last 300 years, experienced a semantic pejoration, and now often stands for mere»arbitrariness«. The article examines the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür. It defends this concept from the charge that it is no consistent thought and rehabilitates it both historically and systematically. First, it exposes the pre-Kantian concept of the »liberum arbitrium voluntatis« in Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz’ »franc arbitre«, which demonstrate the positive sense of the concept. Then itexplores the systematic role of Willkür in Kant’s philosophical work. Finally, it addresses contemporary attempts to revitalize this concept in the analytic debate on freedom.