Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the concept of ›custom‹ (Gepflogenheit) in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Any meaningful human action is underpinned by rules. Custom is situated in the transition phase from the actual rule to the following of this rule. However, as the concept of ›rule‹ is a term with blurred edges and does not allow any ›interpretations behind interpretations‹, it cannot guarantee objectivity. Therefore, a platonic perspective must be adopted which involves fixed rules but makes it impossible to distinguish between appearance and reality. From a grammaticalpoint of view, it is impossible for an agent to follow a rule privately and only once. In this context disposition characterizes the process of a game in two ways, both psychologically as well as physiologically. The notion of custom is examined in the context of an understanding of language game.For Wittgenstein, neither ›Intention‹ nor ›Absicht‹ are considered states of consciousness because they are only of temporary but not of permanentnature.