Abstract

Stephan Zimmermann: Kant über »moralische Argumente«. Worin besteht die Objektivität eines Postulats der reinen praktischen Vernunft? At the end of the Critique of Judgement, Kant returns to his discussion of the doctrine of the postulates of pure practical reason. He there describes the justification for these judgements of faith as ›moral arguments‹. In the course of this, he resolves a hitherto unanswered question, namely what exactly the ›increment‹, as it is already mentioned in the Critique of Practical Reason, consistsi n, when the immortality of the human soul, the freedom of our will and the existence of God are postulated. The paper shows that the underlying ideas of pure theoretical reason shed their subjectivity in the postulates and extend to a certain objectivity. And it explains how this objectivity has to be understood in opposition to that of judgements of experience.