ZEITSCHRIFTENARTIKEL
Schelling’s Concept of Self-Consciousness in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)
Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Bd. 55 (2014), Iss. 0: S. 166–181
Zusätzliche Informationen
Bibliografische Daten
Lang, Stefan
Abstract
Among the central debates within the classical German philosophy after I. Kant is the question of how intentional self-consciousness is possible. In the followingdiscourse, Schelling’s concept of self-consciousness in System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) will be examined and critically discussed. The central theses are,fi rst of all, that for Schelling self-consciousness is a case of intentional consciousness; secondly, that Schelling develops a performative interpretation of intentional self-consciousness; and thirdly, Schelling fails to completely explain intentional self-consciousness.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stefan Lang: Schelling’s Concept of Self-Consciousness in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) | 165 |
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