Abstract

The concept of »transcendental« is undoubtedly one of the most important terms in Kantian philosophy. For over one hundred and fi fty years major Kantianscholars have debated its origin and set out various interpretations. The KantForschung has recently established four different possible sources: 1) Schulmetaphysik 2) Ch. Wolff; 3) A. G. Baumgarten; 4) J. H. Lambert. The aim of this essay is to suggest a different origin and genesis of the Kantian concept of »transcendental« by the methodologies of Quellengeschichte and Begriffsgeschichte, investigating the philosophical and historical background of Königsberg from the beginning of the seventeenth century to Kant and to show reasons for the shift of the concept of »transcendental« from metaphysics to logic. The doctrine of transcendentals was very much alive in Königsberg and already in Scholastic philosophers the »transcendentals« shifted its interest from being to the knowable, from ontology to logic. However, up to 1763, Kant accepts the Wolffi an doctrine of transcendentals and the concept of »transcendental« is synonymousto »metaphysical«. In the second half of the Sixties, probably in the wake of the preparatory works to the Beweisgrund, Kant goes deeply into the interpretationof Baumgarten and the »transcendental« becomes synonymous with »essential« in opposition to »metaphysical«. In the wake of Crusius’ refl ections, instead,»transcendental« becomes »logical« in contrast with »metaphysical«. Beginning in the Seventies, in the preparatory fragments to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft,the »transcendental« establishes itself as a synonymous of »logical« and »essential« in opposition to »metaphysical« and »real«, and it concerns the object ofknowledge in general without any reference to the experience. From this conception derives the concept of »transcendental« of the Kritik der reinen Vernunftas an examination of the condition of the possibility of an a priori knowledge. In the conclusion I argue that Kant did not deduce the doctrine of transcendentalsfrom his logic, but that both doctrines are developed simultaneously and that Kant always tried to integrate them with each other. Fragments of the secondhalf of the Seventies show a progressive attempt of this integration, which was doomed to fail.