Abstract

This article presents a description of the valuing actsbased on the concept of affect (Affekt) that Husserl addresses in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I begin by examining certain approaches to feelings that Husserl develops in his work, especially those in his major works Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I (1 and 2). As I show, his various analyses lack an in-depth description and have an intellectualistic character (3), in contrast to what is contained in the manuscripts of the Studien. Taking this into account, I discuss different moments in the process of valuing (4) in order to discover, delimit and describe in detail the experience that Husserl calls Affekt (5). Although Husserl characterises it as an affective reaction – a kind of affective state -, he recognises in it a distinct intentionality, which I critically examine from three perspectives (6), concluding that the Affekt –together with the turning towards of the ego –is already a valuing (7). Finally, I argue (8) that in order to speak of a valuing in the strict sense of the word –in the sense of a Wertnehmung-, a change of attitude (Einstellungsänderung) towards the Liking-attitude (Gefallenseinstellung) is necessary, which allows a more precise interpretation of the Husserlian concept of Gefallen. The analysis of value acts on the basis of the concept of affect represents a descriptive extension of the traditional understanding (apprehension-content of apprehension model), which invites further research into the possible differences and tensions that arise from it.