Abstract

This article examines Iris Murdoch’s reflections on language and moral philosophy, with particular attention to her analysis of secondary or “thick” evaluative concepts. In contrast to Richard Hare’s prescriptivism, Murdoch emphasizes the inseparability of the descriptive and evaluative aspects of concepts such as “courageous,” “cowardly,” or “vulgar.” Concepts of this kind disclose moral reality, though only through their context-sensitive appropriation by moral subjects. Murdoch underscores that what she calls “moral work” consists above all in this conceptual practice, which in turn shapes the inner life and self-understanding of those who employ such concepts. At the same time, a certain tension emerges—though not an irresolvable one—between Murdoch’s emphasis on the central role of such concepts and her Platonically inspired notion of the Good. The article offers a systematic discussion of this complex of questions and highlights Murdoch’s continuing relevance to current debates on semantics, moral realism, and particularism.