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Philosophie als Wissenschaft?

Der gesellschaftliche Ort philosophischen Denkens bei Dewey und Husserl

Zurück zum Heft: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2019-2: Phenomenology and Pragmatism
DOI: 10.28937/1000108370

Inhalt

  • | Kapitel kaufen Cover1
  • | Kapitel kaufen Inhaltsverzeichnis3
  • | Kapitel kaufen Introduction: Phenomenology and Pragmatism5
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sami Pihlstrçm: Pragmatism and the Phenomenology of Suffering: Remarks on Antitheodicy Detachment, and Embodied Subjectivity13
  • | Kapitel kaufen Ryosuke Ohashi,: Phainomenon‘ und ,Pragma‘ aus euro-japanischer Perspektive – Zur Idee des ,phänomenologischen Pragmatismus‘ im Geschichtsdenken31
  • | Kapitel kaufen Matthias Jung: Philosophie als Wissenschaft? Der gesellschaftliche Ort philosophischen Denkens bei Dewey und Husserl45
  • | Kapitel kaufen Niels Weidtmann: Erfahrung in Pragmatismus und Phänomenologie – Von der Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit zur Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung65
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sebastian Luft: Phenomenology without Foundations = Pragmatism? – Or: What is Left of Phenomenology After a Pragmatic Critique91
  • | Kapitel kaufen Karin Amos: Otto Friedrich Bollnow und John Dewey im Dialog115
  • | Kapitel kaufen Sara Heinämaa: Epoché as Personal Transformation – On the Similarities between the Philosophical Changeof Attitude and Religious Conversions133
  • | Kapitel kaufen Jason Bell: Lotze’s System SIGMA: An Inspiration for Pragmatic ‘Internal and External Meaning of Ideas’and Phenomenological ’Intentionality’?161
  • | Kapitel kaufen Steven Crowell: Transcendental Phenomenology as Irony?187
  • | Kapitel kaufen Autorinnen und Autoren207

Beschreibung

This paper begins by pointing out the commonality of phenomenology and pragmatism, particularly by referring to Husserl and Dewey, respectively, but it soon turns to fundamental differences. The common starting point is the acknowledgement of everyday experience as the basis of any scientific proposition as well as any non-scientific notion of the world. Phenomenology and pragmatism are allies in their rejection of scientism. However, while Husserl reflects on the structure of experience in order to establish a theoretical view that allows us to scrutinize ordinary and scientific experience from without, from some privileged standpoint, Dewey states that the process of experience, properly conceived and due to its entanglement with action in a contingent world, is always already self-reflective. Philosophy is thus conceived of as the practice of internal criticism that relies on the very form of contingent experience, not, as in Husserl’s work, as some transcendental foundation drawing upon an ideal of timeless reason. Husserl’s conception of philosophy is scientific, while anti-scientistic, whereas Dewey sees philosophy as structurally different from science while mediating between it and all other forms of experience.